Agents of Ideology: How Latin American Youth Shaped Cold War Narratives Through Semi-Autonomy and Cultural Appeal

The Cold War served as a critical catalyst for the rise and global significance of youth movements in Latin America. During this period, young people around the world became politically engaged, challenging the passive role that earlier generations of youth had played. Rather than merely supplementing existing ideologies, youth movements in Latin America became key drivers for the expansion and perpetuation of both Soviet and U.S. influences in the 1960s. Some argue that these movements opened a "third way" of thinking, offering alternatives to the strict polarization of the Cold War. However, while examples supporting this view exist, paradoxically, movements in Latin America also acted as instruments for sustaining traditional communist and anti-communist doctrines. To examine this dynamic, we focus on two youth-driven initiatives, the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) and the Uruguayan Communist Party's cultural supplement, La Morsa. The DRE, created in 1960, was an anti-Castro group that opposed the Cuban Revolution and expanded its activities throughout Latin America. Although initially aligned with the Revolution’s goals, the DRE shifted its stance after it argued the Revolution failed to uphold its original promises. Chase argues that youth movements, like the Revolutionary Student Directorate (DRE), used cultural and ideological flexibility to attract a broad spectrum of supporters, including apolitical youth, while navigating complex relationships with external powers such as the CIA. During the same period Markarian argues how the rise of the New Left across Latin America engaged a growing number of politically active youth. Uruguay was no exception, with the UJC (Uruguayan Communist Youth) leveraging the cultural appeal of La Morsa to attract not only politically engaged youth but especially those who were previously apolitical. Youth in Latin America acted as a powerful catalyst for the expansion of both anti-communist and communist ideologies during the Cold War, largely due to their semi-autonomy from party ideology and the attraction of an apolitical youth through alternative methods of persuasion. This unique position helped youth bridge global ideologies making both communist and anti-communist movements more adaptable and relatable.

Latin American youth during the Cold War, operated with a degree of independence from rigid party ideologies, using external support to further their own localized agendas while maintaining flexibility in their political engagements. Figure A shows how this led to the expansion of anti-communism in Latin America. The following section of this paper especially focuses on how the DRE pushed through its own ideologies despite receiving funding from the CIA (Chase 644). The DRE was in fact supported but never fully funded or controlled by the CIA. Albeit the DRE’s relationship with the CIA could be classified as good and its tendencies surely align more with that of the United States there existed plenty of instances where the DRE appears to have their own ideologies leading to an attraction of the youth and clashes with the CIA. For example, the DRE was vocal in denouncing the bloody repression carried out by the United States in the Southern Cone. Similarly, they are an unusual example of an anti-communist group that allied with different political factions across a large spectrum. The DRE was present in the ceremonies of Mexico’s far-right Catholic nationalists and the Soviet-sponsored World Festival of Youth and Students. (Chase 646). In Ecuador, they partnered with the AAE (Ecuadorian Anti-Communist Action) while in Bolivia they did so with the Bolivian Socialist Falange.   As a youth group with no real political party the DRE had more liberty as to choose whose ideals to follow as opposed to leaders like Jose Maria Figueres in Costa Rica which had to be vocal on their anti-communist stance. The DRE did not strictly abide by the United State’s agenda in many other forms. For instance the CIA had wanted for the DRE to function as a group that worked on psychological operations. Instead the DRE preferred to contribute to armed opposition and hence did not receive any funding for the commando raids of 1962 and 1963 (Chase 651). The DRE viewed the CIA as “vacillating, misguided and weak at best”  while the CIA regarded the DRE’s attitude as “contempt repeat contempt”. The DRE, though anti-communist, adopted some progressive ideals, especially as the New Left rose in Latin America. Still, as the CIA sought to influence and promote anti-communism it was certainly good for them to have the DRE as an instrument to do so. On the other hand, the DRE did enjoy generous funding from the CIA itself. For now, the situation remained a win-win for both sides. Above all, it propagated the spread of anti-communism. The DRE and CIA’s agenda can be described as “a continuously strained marriage of convenience, not a simple story of co-optation or control.” (Chase 654). While the DRE promoted anti-communism, it constantly debated the limits of its policies. This was new and attracted more youth hence growing the anticommunist stance of the youth. The DRE believed in legitimately influencing the left and New Left and promoted debate surrounding the strict terms of democracy, revolution, solidarity, and self-determination. The DRE was forced to stretch its ideological horizons (Chase 661). In a trip to Africa in 1962 it even tried to distance itself from the United States (Chase 662). The DRE was one of many youth groups which fueled the expansion of Cold War tendencies. This openness in tendencies prevailed. For instance, the leader of left-wing media La Morsa mentioned how sometimes it was acceptable to let some “heresies” slip by. (Markarian 379). In a world so polarized, it is easy to see why the youth were attracted to this somewhat independent way of thinking. This also demonstrates how the Uruguayan Communist Party (PCP), originally established in the 1930s as an orthodox, Leninist-aligned party, shifted its stance with the emergence of youth influence in the 1960s. Eventually “the party downplayed the importance of style among the younger generation (Markarian 373). As shown in this paper, the youth’s involvement led to the development of semi-autonomous policies, marking a departure from the party's earlier rigid adherence to Leninist principles which paradoxically ended up recruiting more people to endorse communism. Despite the many examples that exist that prove the DRE’s intention for a fluid self-serving ideology in the Cold War, this did end up ultimately benefiting the United States. The imperialist struggle was against communism and so was theirs.  As the group constantly denounced “Soviet Imperialism” this raises the question of how legit was the independence of the DRE and La Morsa to those more orthodox actors above them. Additionally, anticommunism and communism might have grown but not in a way that completely aligned with the CIA’s vision (Chase 654).

By leveraging cultural movements like music and pop culture, youth movements were able to attract apolitical youth who may not have been initially interested in ideological struggles, thereby broadening the reach of both communist and anti-communist ideologies. While La Morsa did implement certain political elements it also included elements that appealed to this apolitical youth such as lottery and horse racing results. La Morsa was filled with content that engaged with people whose main concerns did not involve politics (Markarian 376). Certainly, most youth would prefer to engage with those topics of fashion, drugs, sex, and music instead of politics. Music had a significant role as The Walrus was named after The Beatles' song "I Am the Walrus". These forms of imagery resonated with the apolitical youth by appealing to their ethos, pathos, and logos. La Morsa captivated readers by presenting a logical and emotional understanding of the era's ideological currents (logos and pathos) while establishing credibility (ethos) through the authority of its content. This would make people engage with La Morsa and target the apolitical youth to become politically active in the future. Similar to La Morsa in attracting a new group of apolitical youth was President Kennedy’s Peace Corps, he too appealed to Americans' emotions (pathos) and fostered a sense of camaraderie, often associated with Soviet ideals, among Americans. The Peace Corps is a U.S. volunteer program founded in 1961, where Americans served abroad. This was the perfect hook to attract those of an apolitical youth nature since the ideological charge of the Peace Corps in the Third World was much deeper than many volunteers originally believed (Purcell 142). In order to further these attempts The Walrus even incorporated Don Pascual, a segment of musicians, left-leaning journalists, and others interested in promoting alternative channels for the circulation of their music (Markarian 384). This segment of the PCP’s newspapers specifically catered to an audience that embodied two traits: youth and apoliticism. Groups of hippies who were not fully engaged in politics often used such publications. For example, in 1970, El Popular, a Uruguayan magazine, published an article stating that these alternative forms of persuasion had inspired hippies and those less politically active to become involved with leftist causes. However, while these methods attracted a new crowd, it raises the question of what role these apolitical actors played within the structure of these parties. Even Che Guevara, a self-proclaimed bohemian, ultimately rejected bohemianism to fully commit to his cause. There is no doubt that he left a lasting legacy in the Americas, but despite being part of the youth, he was always interested in politics, so he didn’t belong to the apolitical category. Expanding on this point, the question arises about the effectiveness of La Morsa. For instance, paternalism was evident within the PCU, meaning that these persuasion methods might have been effective on youth, but not on the PCU’s leadership. The attraction to these movements often revolved more around cultural identity and self-expression than genuine ideological commitment. Additionally, La Morsa promoted artists like Frank Sinatra, who in this case supported the Vietnam War (Markarian 382). As these examples indicate, those involved in La Morsa were aware that its promotion of cultural forms and products from global power centers openly contradicted the principles of the anti-imperialist left. 

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